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Wayne Michael Hall is a retired Army Intelligence brigadier general (BG) who served in various
positions to include the J2 of US Army Forces Korea. He received an Ed.D from George
Washington University and is the author of Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age and
coauthor of Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments. Coauthor, Gary
Citrenbaum, is the president and chief scientist of System of Systems Analytics, Inc. This
company focuses on technical intelligence issues. Dr. Citrenbaum received his degree from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
This book tries to be a monograph on the whys and hows of establishing collection operations
primarily in urban environments against unconventional warfare threats. The principal author,
BG Hall, has a depth of experience in the Intelligence Community from an operational
perspective. His career in the US Army spans approximately thirty years where he had positions
from S2 to J2. Dr. Citrenbaum is somewhat of a mystery. Searches on-line only reveal his
position with his corporation and the coauthored texts. Thus, his relevancy to this work is
undetermined. From reviews on the other books coauthored by Dr. Citrenbaum, it would appear
that his contribution is in the analytical realm while BG Hall’s is operational.
This particular work is a continuation on the theme of what BG Hall establishes as knowledge
war and is presented in a construct that is very reminiscent of the Semiotics Philosophy thinking
as espoused by Charles Sanders Pierce. There are many researchers and philosophers who
embrace this philosophy, opposing, in their view, the antiquated and wrong-thinking approaches
of the scientific methodology as either passé or even totally erroneous. This particular book
embraces the aspects of advanced thinking espoused by Pierce and others, yet appears to neglect
the necessities of true cognitive science. The authors attempt to establish what they believe is a
new and dynamic functionality to the process of collecting information and turning it into
intelligence. Their text relates to, yet establishes as antiquated, an analytical process that has
been successful for thousands of years. The basic gist of this review is that of King Solomon (or
possibly another individual named Koheleth) who stated in Ecclesiastes 1:9, “What has been will
be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.”
The authors state in their introduction that; “This is a book about change – change in our [the
intelligence community’s] metacognition . . . that forms the basis for how we think about
intelligence collection operations” (p. 1). They posit this new structure in what they term
advanced analysis/advanced collection practices. A few sentences later, the aspect of advanced
collection is defined as, “[finding] subtle, nuanced, and often fleeting observables indicting the
presence and activities of well-obscured adversaries, and the often subtle outcomes of
commanders’ actions and verbal interactions with the contested populace [semiotics] . . .” (p. 2).
While this is a laudable goal, it is no different from the philosophy of any other analytical
process, particularly those involving military intelligence operations. What is particularly
daunting is that within its premise is the theorem that logical analysis in an advanced format is
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necessary to the survival of American intelligence organs, and that any failure of these organs to
adopt the changes identified in this text “are failing to take advantage of one of the greatest
capabilities of the United States” (p. 6). This statement is, in itself, a logical fallacy.
For the next seventy-five pages, the text drives through a matrix of acronyms and repeated
concepts making it a very difficult read; even for someone who enjoys texts such as this one. It
wasn’t until completing the first seventy-five pages that it became clear that the relationship
between advanced analysis and advanced collection is simply the ability to use logic to pull
information together to form precognitive intelligence of an enemy’s intentions, which is and has
been the basis of intelligence operations since Moses sent Joshua into Canaan.
Most such texts establish their philosophy or thesis early in the work, using the remainder to
establish processes, outline procedures, define structures, and delineate the logic of how these
elements combine to form a desirable whole. This text does not formally establish its philosophy
until page 216. After this point, there is a wealth of information of value to the analyst/student,
which is indicative of where the true beginning should have been.
At this point, details, such as the concept of deep think, defined earlier in the text are finally
applied to the thesis, yet without specific delineation of its process. In fact, the authors even
define their concept of deep think as: “We use the term deep think to mean taking the time and
expending the mental energy to think about a subject deeply and critically” (p. 154). This is an
obvious circular argument. Much later in the text (p. 359) the authors delve into the dynamics of
deep think sufficiently to identify it as the need for self-perception of attitudes and biases that
influence our own thought processes and use this knowledge as a primary factor in any analytical
compilations. This aspect is solid gold and is a critical element missing in both the professional
discipline of intelligence and educating it.
Finally, there are many sections of the text where the authors develop concepts and itemized
lists/checklists for the collection of useful, complex environment information only to then turn
around and denigrate the concept as either undoable or cost-adverse. Specifically:
Gaining physical access to difficult targets in [irregular warfare] is important but
usually difficult (170).
. . . sometimes direct access is clearly too difficult or perhaps not even possible [to
achieve] (171).
Unfortunately, [to create the appropriate HUMINT collection capability defined in this
text] we would need several networks of networks scattered around the world in potential
insurgency and terrorist hot spots. That might prove infeasible owing to costs, low
returns on places in which an insurgency never emerges, and the always present specter
of people simply milking money and producing false or very sketchy data – a cost/benefit
issue (247).
We must also admit that we cannot seek and find the detailed, pertinent data that
commanders in IW [irregular warfare] situations require . . . (p. 254).
As stated earlier, once the reader is past the first hundred or so pages, the text begins to outline
many significant and important aspects of how intelligence collection should be performed, and
130
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss3/14
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3.14

Nimon: Intelligence Collection: How to Plan and Execute

often is not. In this single aspect, the book is worth reading if only to reestablish the structures
that should exist and be taught in the intelligence community. This is not stating that these
structures are NOT being taught or that there are not other, better texts in existence to achieve
this goal more efficiently.
The book can, and does, present the semiotics approach to intelligence collection however, with
the disturbing omission or unawareness that the true nature and neurological processes of
cognition have yet to be discovered and defined. Many theories exist as do a plethora of
philosophies, however, all are based upon a non-existent knowledge of how humans actually
generate thoughts, ideas, concepts, etc. out of little-to-no previous knowledge. This aspect will
remain true until cognitive science is able to succinctly establish the process of human thought.
While I would not purchase this book at the asking price, I am now interested in reading his
remaining works out of simple curiosity to understand BG Hall and his philosophy better.
However, I would never require any of my students to read this text unless part of a dissertation
source review on the comparison of standard intelligence cognition techniques to semiotics, and
then only after cautioning advisements.
Harry I. Nimon, Ph.D., Henley-Putnam University
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